Fardc Collective Agreement

Amid the other difficulties in creating new armed forces for the Democratic Republic of Congo, the integration and training process was skewed in early 2007 when the government of Kabila`s Democratic Republic of Congo attempted to use it to gain more control over dissident General Laurent Nkunda. In an oral agreement hastily negotiated in Rwanda, three government college brigades were integrated into the former ANC 81 and 83rd Dienunda Brigades in the so-called mixer. Mixing brought several fractions into compound brigades, but without the 45-day brass recycling, and it seems that the process was actually limited to the exchange of battalions between the faculties and the Nkunda brigades in North Kivu, without further integration. With Nkunda`s troops having greater cohesion, Nkunda effectively took control of the five brigades, which was not the intention of the central government of the Democratic Republic of Congo. [121] However, after Nkunda had used the mixed brigades to fight the FDLR, tensions erupted between the Bledc and Nkunda-loyalists within the brigades, which collapsed in the last days of August 2007. The International Crisis Group says that “until 30 August [2007] Nkunda`s troops had left the mixed brigades and controlled much of the Masisi and Rutshuru areas” (North Kivu). [122] On 14 July 1960, at the request of Prime Minister Lumumba, the UN Security Council adopted UN Security Council Resolution 143. This called on Belgium to withdraw its troops and asked the UN to provide military assistance to the Congolese armed forces so that they could “fully carry out their mission”. Lumumba asked Belgium to immediately cut off its troops and threatened to seek help from the Soviet Union if they did not leave within two days. The United Nations reacted quickly and set up the United Nations Operation in Congo (UNOC). The first UN forces arrived the next day, but there were immediate disagreements between Lumumba and the United Nations over the mandate of the new force. With the Congolese army in turmoil since the mutiny, Lumumba wanted to deploy UN forces to subdue Katanga by force.

Lumumba was extremely frustrated by the UN`s reluctance to resort to violence against Tshombe and his secession. [24] He cancelled a scheduled meeting with Secretary-General Hammarskjunld on 14 August and wrote a series of furious letters. [25] For Hammarskjild, the secession of katanga was an intercongolaise affair and the United Nations was prohibited from intervening in accordance with Article 2 of the United Nations Charter. Disagreement over what the UN force could and could not do throughout its operation. It should also be noted that Joseph Kabila does not trust the army; The Republican Guard is the only component he trusts. Major General John Numbi, former head of the air force and now inspector general of police, led a parallel chain of command to the east to lead the 2009 offensive in eastern Congo, Operation Umoja Wetu; The chain of command has been bypassed. Previously, Numbi negotiated with Laurent Nkunda the agreement to implement the mixing process. [98] Baoudin Amba Wetshi of lecongolais.cd called Ntolo a “scapegoat.” Wetshi said that all important military and security issues were dealt with in total secrecy by the president and other civilian and military figures he trusted, such as John Numbi, Gabriel Amisi Kumba (“Tango Four”), the Kahimbi dolphin and others like Kalev Mutond and Pierre Lumbi Okongo. [99] M23, named after a peace agreement signed on 1 March.